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Pursuing Health as Foreign Policy:

The Case of China
YANZHONG HUANG*

I. INTRODUCTION: HEALTH, FOREIGN POLICY, AND CHINA

"Health is today a growing concern in foreign policy," the DirectorGeneral of the World Health Organization (WHO) announced with the
foreign ministers of Norway and France in an editorial last year.1
Although health has long been a foreign policy issue, 2 health was
historically separate from foreign policy: the study and practice of
foreign policy neglected public health, and public health was
predominantly a domestic policy concern.3 It was not until the 1980s
that an unprecedented collision of the worlds of health and foreign
policy began to occur. Events and developments in the political and
epidemiological world-globalization, the rise of infectious disease, and
the end of the Cold War-highlighted the importance of health as a key
element of development and security policy. This, in turn, led to an
epistemological change in both policy and academic circles. In
September 2006, the foreign affairs ministers of seven countries
* Associate Professor and Director of the Center for Global Health Studies, John C.
Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University;
Editor, Global Health Governance: The Scholarly Journal for the New Health Security
Paradigm. This paper was completed while the author was a Visiting Senior Research
Fellow at the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore.
1. Margret Chan et al., Foreign Policy and Global Public Health: Working Together
Towards Common Goals, 86 BULL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 498, 498 (2008).
2. See Vincanne Adams et al., Global Health Diplomacy, 27 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY
315, 316, 322 n.1 (2009). See generally Alexandra Minna Stern & Howard Markel,
InternationalEfforts to Control Infectious Diseases, 1851 to the Present, 292 JAMA 1474
(2004) (reviewing 3 historical eras of international approaches to controlling infectious
diseases). In 1851, the first International Sanitary Conference was held in Paris and was
attended by diplomats and physicians from 11 European countries, which set the stage for
future international health diplomacy efforts. Id. at 1475.
3. See Randy Cheek, Public Health as a Global Security Issue, FOREIGN SERVICE J.,
Dec. 2004, at 22, 23; Ilona Kickbusch, Global Health Governance: Some Theoretical
Considerations on the New Political Space, in HEALTH IMPACTS OF GLOBALIZATION:
TOWARDS GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 192, 200 (Kelley Lee ed., 2003).
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launched the Global Health and Foreign Policy Initiative. Bemoaning
that "health is one of the most important, yet still broadly neglected,
long-term foreign policy issues of our time," the ministers agreed to
make impact on health "a point of departure and a defining lens" that
each country would use to examine key elements of foreign policy and
development strategies. 4 In academia, growing awareness of a
transformation in the health-foreign policy relationship produced a
proliferation of global health programs as well as an emerging literature
centered on health and foreign policy.
Despite the growing political and academic interest in health as a
foreign policy issue, much of the emerging scholarship has focused on
the conceptual overview of the field or particular aspects of the healthforeign policy linkage (e.g., humanitarian action). 5 Little in-depth
analysis has been conducted on how major powers engage health as a
foreign policy issue. As a result, there is limited knowledge of their
views on the relationship between health and foreign policy, the
dynamics of power and interests in this relationship, and the
implications of such dynamics for global health governance. The lack of
scholarship in this area is no surprise, as the structure of global health
governance began to take shape in an age of "nonpolarity" featuring
multiple actors and political levels, each possessing and exercising
various kinds of power.6 Yet, despite the rise of this "market7
multilateralism," nation states remain at the core of health governance.
Not only do governments increasingly address health as a key function
of foreign policy, but international health activities continue to reflect
the desires and interests of the great powers.8
Among the major powers, China plays a critical role in the complex
dynamics among health, prosperity, and security. It has one-fifth of the
world's population and one-seventh of the world's disease burden,

4. Celso Amorim et al., Oslo Ministerial Declaration - Global Health: A Pressing
Foreign Policy Issue of Our Time, 369 THE LANCET 1373, 1373 (2007).
5. For an example of current scholarship on health and foreign policy that does not
examine how major powers use health to further their foreign policy objectives, see WHO,
Special Theme Issue: Health and Foreign Policy, 86 BuLL. OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORG.
161 (2007).
6. See Richard N. Haas, The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance,
FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2008, at 44, 44-45. See generally Ilona Kickbusch, Moving Global
Health Governance Forward, in MAKING SENSE OF GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: A
POLICY PERSPECTIVE 320 (Kent Buse et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the international
dynamics of a nonpolar world and the need for a new discourse on global health).
7. See Kickbusch, supra note 6, at 325.
8. David P. Fidler, Health as Foreign Policy: Between Principle and Power,
WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT'L AFF., Summer-Fall 2005, at 179, 189.
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measured in years of healthy life lost. 9 Historically, some major disease
outbreaks in China, including the 1957 Asian flu, the 1968 Hong Kong
flu, and the 2003 SARS epidemic, have triggered epidemics elsewhere in
the world. As demonstrated in the SARS epidemic, the resulting
spillover of disease outbreaks in China can have serious implications for
stability, prosperity, and security at the regional and global levels.
This article examines the dynamics of the health-foreign policy
nexus in China. After an overview of the Maoist health diplomacy, it
discusses the elevation of health issues in the hierarchy of foreign policy
objectives in China's reform era. Next, the article analyzes China's
SARS diplomacy, which further demonstrates the changing landscape of
health and foreign policy in China. Then I analyze the defining features
and dilemmas of China's health-foreign policy interaction. While the
emergence of health as an important foreign policy issue in China
facilitates the fulfillment of its foreign policy goals and makes important
contributions to international health cooperation, I conclude that the
tensions and dilemmas inherent in the health-foreign policy mix in
China pose risks and challenges to global health governance.
II. THE MAOIST HEALTH DIPLOMACY
China has long been an important contributor to global health
simply because of the sheer size of its population. By the 1970s, the
Maoist health model, with its emphasis on equality, primary health
care, community participation, and devolved decision making, not only
improved the health status of 22.5 percent of the world's population, but
it also significantly influenced the agenda of WHO. Encouraged by
China's success, WHO declared in 1978 that "health for all" by the year
2000 was achievable through primary health care. 10
However, this Chinese contribution was driven by neither concern
about the possible spread of infectious diseases nor the potential
benefits improved world health might bring to the international system.
Against the backdrop of the Cold War, China's participation in
international cooperation on health was very limited. In the face of the
U.S.-led blockade, it chose to "lean toward one side" by prioritizing
health-related international cooperation with socialist countries. Not
surprisingly, almost all of China's health-related cooperation
agreements were with nations in the Soviet bloc.
9. WHO, China to Study Links Between Sustainable Development and Investment in
Health, Dec. 18, 2002, availableat http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/pr96/
en].
10. See Paul Johnstone & Isobel McConnan, Primary Health Care Led NHS: Learning
from Developing Countries,311 BRIT. MED. J 891, 891 (1995).
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In the early 1960s, with the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations
and the continuation of Sino-American confrontation, China needed to
break its diplomatic isolation. As a result, China attached great
importance to the "intermediate zones" (zhongjian didai)separating the
two superpowers: the developing world, comprised of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America; and the rest of the industrialized world, including
Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and Japan." This foreign policy
reorientation led to the establishment of official and nonofficial healthrelated exchange programs with developing countries as well as with
some Western countries, such as Canada.
The launch of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s saw the
radicalization of China's foreign policy and efforts to "export revolution."
China's role as a revisionist country in the international system became
obvious when Mao's revolutionary strategy of "encirclement of the cities
by the countryside" was transposed to an international strategy of
surrounding "the cities of the world" (i.e., the industrial continents)
from "the countryside of the world" (i.e., underdeveloped continents), a
12
strategy which is fundamentally contrary to a system of nation-states.
This foreign policy shift coincided with national liberation movements
worldwide. Consequently, China ceased its exchange programs with
Western countries and utilized foreign aid to expand its political
influence in a large number of newly independent states.
Similar to Cuba, China made medical assistance part of exporting
revolution. In April 1963, the first Chinese foreign aid medical team
arrived in newly independent Algeria, where the war of national
liberation against France had resulted in a mass exodus of the
physicians, teachers, civil servants, and skilled workers. From that
point on, China sent a steady trickle of medical teams to the African
continent. The administrative structure of the medical teams
demonstrated that China was using them as an instrument of health
diplomacy. Although health bureaus in twenty-six provincial units
assembled the medical teams, the management of the teams was not the
responsibility of the Ministry of Health, but instead the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economics and Trade. Operated like
the U.S. Peace Corps, but with an exclusive focus on medical care, each
Chinese medical team was typically composed of ten to fifteen
physicians, laboratory technicians, and assistants. Between 1963 and
11. Mao Zedong, Zhongjian didai you liangge [There are Two Intermediate Zones], in
MAO ZEDONG WAIJIAO WENXUAN [SELECTED DIPLOMATIC WORKS OF MAO ZEDONG] 506-09

(1994).
12. LIN PIAO, LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLE'S WAR - COMMEMORATING THE
20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE VICTORY OF THE ANT-JAPANESE WAR OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE

49 (Foreign Languages Press 1966) (1965).
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1982, 6,500 Chinese health workers joined the medical teams and
served a total of seventy million people in forty-two countries. Three
quarters of the recipient countries (thirty-two) are in Africa, a regional
priority of China's foreign policy (see Table 1).
Table 1. Recipient Countries for China's Medical Teams (19631982), by Region
Region
Country
Africa

Algeria, Zanzibar (Tanzania), Somalia, Congo, Mali,
Tanganyika (Tanzania), Mauritania, Guinea, Sudan,
Equatorial Guinea, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, Zaire,
Togo, Senegal, Madagascar, Morocco, Niger,
Mozambique, Sdo Tom6 and Principe, Upper Volta
(Burkina Faso), Guinea-Bissau, Gabon, Gambia,
Benin, Zambia, Central African Republic, Botswana,
Djibouti, Rwanda, Ethiopia,* Cameroon,* Chad*

Middle East

North Yemen, South Yemen, Kuwait, United Arab
Emirates, Syria,* Iran*

Southeast Asia

Laos,* Vietnam,* Cambodia*

Dispatch discontinued due to expiration of the agreement or
deterioration of diplomatic relations.
*

Source: China Health Y.B. 1983, 378, 386.
The dispatch of the medical teams bore the firm imprint of the
Maoist policy structure. Chinese medical teams usually brought their
own equipment and medicines. Until 1978, they provided services, in
addition to some material supplies, completely free of charge, despite
requests of some recipient countries to chip in.' 3 Most of the medical
teams operated in outlying areas where access to health care was
difficult or impossible for local people to obtain. In doing so, they focused
more on preventive care than on emergency medical care. 14 Their
services reportedly helped win China friendship in the third world,
13. Zhou Jianping, Dui woguo yuanwai yiliaodui youguan wenti tantao [Investigating
Problems Related to Our Country's Foreign-aidMedical Teams], ZHONGGUO WEISHENG
JINGJI [CHINESE HEALTH ECON.], issue no. 3, 1984, at 39, 39 (P.R.C.).
14. ALAN HUTCHISON, CHINA'S AFRICAN REVOLUTION 220-21 (1975).
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especially in Africa. A spokesman for China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
has expressed the belief that the work of the medical teams played a
positive role in China's 1971 admission to the U.N.15 A report of the
Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress concurred by
concluding that "[m]edical services have proven one of China's most
effective economic aid programs in the Third World."16 By the end of
1982, Chinese medical teams were still active in twenty-nine African

countries. 17
The frequency of health intersecting with Chinese foreign policy
increased in the 1970s, when China resumed its membership at the
U.N. and WHO. In September 1972, China signed the Basic Agreement
with the U.N. Development Programme (UNDP), which allowed UNDP
to fund projects covering areas of health-manpower development,
medical information, traditional medicine, pharmaceutical standards,
and primary health care. In December 1978, the Ministry of Health
signed a historic Memorandum of Understanding with WHO, which
designated forty-one research institutes in China as WHO Cooperation
Centers. As part of this deal, China paid membership dues of U.S.$15.1
million for the years 1980-1981 and U.S.$7.6 million for 1982-1983. In
addition to its participation in WHO, China also began to contribute to
the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Soon, it used loans from
the World Bank to improve medical education and rural health care. At
almost the same time, China and the United States began to cooperate
under the auspices of a Health Protocol signed in 1979.
Despite its expanding interest in health diplomacy, China's
engagement in international health remained limited in scope and
symbolic in nature. Until the early 1980s, foreign policy shaped the
Chinese government's health agenda in the developing world, not vice
versa. In the words of Fidler, health for China in this time period was
"merely another issue with which traditional approaches to foreign
policy grapple."1 8 Because of China's hostility toward multilateralism,
much of its health diplomacy was conducted bilaterally. Since it
regarded the international system as alien and illegitimate, the issue of
China being a responsible power in the system was not part of the
foreign policy agenda. China's lack of significant interaction with the

15. Lu Haiwen, Zhongguo yuanwai yiliaodui: 40 nian qingqing zhenzhi 2.4 yi renci
[Chinese Foreign-aidMedical Teams: Heartily Treating 240 Million Patients Over Forty
Years], HUAXIA SHIBAO [HUAXIA TIMES] (P.R.C.), Dec. 3, 2003, at 7.
16. Carol Fogarty, Chinese Relations with the Third World, in 1 CHINESE ECONOMY
POST-MAO: A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS SUBMITTED TO THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 856 (1978).

17. CHINA HEALTH Y.B. 1983 386.
18. Fidler, supranote 8, at 184.
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outside world not only allowed a clear demarcation between domestic
and international health, but it also reduced the need to respond to
international demands and pressures over health issues.
III. THE CHANGING CHINESE LANDSCAPE OF HEALTH AND
FOREIGN POLICY
In 1982, as "politics in command" gave way to a developmentcentered agenda, China restructured its foreign aid policy to focus on
economic interests, reciprocity, and diversity in cooperation.' 9 The
changing aid policy priorities, coupled with the growing call for "acting
in accordance with market laws" (an shichang guilu banshi), led to
significant changes in the funding of foreign aid medical teams. By the
early 1980s, sixty percent of the recipient countries were contributing to
the financing of the Chinese medical teams, and only eleven percent still
received medical aid for free. 20 For those countries that shouldered the
full cost, the medical teams were no longer part of China's "foreign aid"
package. 21 When the medical teams started charging patients fees, it
further undermined China's ability to leverage medical teams as a
22
foreign policy instrument.
In China, the market-oriented economic reforms reinforced the idea
of pursuing economic solutions to social policy problems and
transformed hospitals into profit-making machines. 23 In this context,
the growing opportunity cost meant health workers became reluctant to
join the foreign aid medical teams, while hospitals had few incentives to
send out experienced physicians. Stagnating government funding and
growing demands from recipient countries for more high-end care
exacerbated the difficulty in dispatching medical teams. 24 As economic
19. See Zhang Yuhui, Zhongguo duiwai yuanzhu yanjiu [A Study of China's Foreign
Aid] 117-18 (Mar. 2006) (Ph.D. dissertation, Central Party School) (P.R.C.).
20. The remaining 29 percent paid for the services with loans provided by the Chinese
government. See Zhou Jianping, supra note 13.
21. See Liu Zhenguo & Zheng Yurong, Dui yuanwai yiliaodui gaige de ji dian sikao
[SeveralReflections on the Reform of Foreign-Aid Medical Teams], YIXUE YANJIU TONGXUN
[MED. RES. CORRESPONDENCE], issue no. 10, 1997, at 49 (P.R.C.).

22. See generally Li Feng, Jiusi fushang chuanbo youyi (guanzhu Feizhou) [Healing the
Wounded and Rescuing the Dying, Spreading Friendship (Focus on Africa)], RENMIN
RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY]
(P.R.C.), Dec. 16, 2006, at 3, available at
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2006-12/16/content_12109978.htm
(describing
certain hospital fees charged by a Chinese medical team at a hospital in Madagascar).
23. Yanzhong Huang, The Paradoxical Transition in China's Health System, HARV.
HEALTH POLY REV., Spring 2002, at 78, availableat http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/-epihc/
currentissue/spring2002/huang.php.
24. China annually budgeted RMB100-200 million for foreign aid medical teams. See
Huang Xuan, Yuanwai yiliao gongzuo yunniang shang xin taijie [Medical Foreign-Aid

112

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

efficiency considerations lessened the political nature of sending out
medical teams, the quality and discipline of the medical teams slipped.
In August 2001, Belgian police arrested fifteen Chinese medical staff on
their way home from Mali in the Brussels International Airport on
suspicion that they were smuggling ivory and ivory products. They were
released, but the international image of Chinese medical teams was
25
tarnished.
In view of China's limited engagement in international health,
adopting a foreign policy stance that gave greater priority to health
issues would require reassessing the way China related to the rest of
the world. In the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese foreign policy rejected the
dominant norms of the international society and sought to articulate
new conceptions based on its own revolutionary vision. 26 The end of the
Cold War and China's integration into the world economy led to soulsearching for China's "identity" in the international system. During the
1990s, China developed a new sense of accountability and commitment
in its interactions with the outside world. As Johnston observed, on
major global issues, such as international trade and arms control, China
has become "more integrated into and more cooperative within
international institutions than ever before." 27 Much of this more positive
foreign policy behavior reflects China's wish to be viewed not as a rule
breaker or a challenger, but as an internationally responsible state that
actively engages in international affairs, even though moving in this
28
direction entails acceptance of more restraints on its sovereignty.
China's new identity also prompted new thinking about the
meaning of security and international cooperation. Although the
Chinese government did not officially adopt the term "non-traditional
security" (NTS) until 2001, it unveiled its "new security concept" as
early as 1996 at the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN). The new security concept, constituting the core
of China's foreign policy strategy, was elaborated in a position paper
submitted to the Forum in July 2002. According to the paper, the
essence of the new security concept is to "rise above one-sided security
Work Considers Entering a New Stage], RENMIN ZHENGXIE BAo [PEOPLE'S POL.
CONSULTATIVE DAILY] (P.R.C.), Dec. 10, 2003.
25. See Wu Ang, Zhongguo yisheng he Feizhou daxiang [Chinese Doctors and African
Elephants], SANLIAN SHENGHUO ZHOUKAN [LIFE WEEK], issue no. 33, 2001 (P.R.C.),
available at http://www.chinanews.com.cn/zhonghuawenzhai/2001-11-01/txt/22.htm.
26. See Rosemary Foot, Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State, 45 CHINA J.
1, 4-6 (2001).
27. Alastair lain Johnston, Is China a Status Quo Power?, INT'L SECURITY, Spring
2003, at 5, 49.
28. See Foot, supra note 26, at 15; see also WANG YIZHOU, QUANQU ZHENGZHI HE
ZHONGGUO WAIJIAO [GLOBAL POLITICS AND CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY] 184-85 (2003).
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and seek common security through mutually beneficial cooperation." 29
In December 2002, an official document formally included tackling NTS
threats as part of China's national defense. 30
The development of the new security concept changed the discourse
of Chinese foreign policy, allowing into the policy process a wide range
of nontraditional and nonmilitary issues. It also connected national
security to international security. A joint declaration signed between
China and ASEAN in November 2002, for example, recognized that
China and ASEAN shared "extensive common interests" in coping with
NTS threats and emphasized the need to strengthen regional and
international cooperation.31 Chinese leaders apparently fell under the
sway of this paradigmatic shift. Then-President Jiang Zemin said that
as "countries increase their interdependency and common ground on
security, it has become difficult for any single country to realize its
security objective by itself alone. Only by strengthening international
cooperation can we effectively deal with the security challenge
worldwide and realize universal and sustained security. 3 2
Neither the July 2002 position paper nor the November 2002 joint
declaration specified health problems as a NTS threat, but Chinese
government leaders soon felt the international pressure to do so. In
June 2002, a U.N. report entitled "HIVIAIDS: China's Titanic Peril" was
released, raising the specter that the disease could rapidly spread
among the general population in China. 33 Chinese officials rejected the
report, but it became increasingly clear that HIV/AIDS is not just a
public health problem, but also one that has significant social, economic,
political, and security implications, and therefore demands the highest
34
level of political attention.

29. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China's Position Paper on the New Security Concept
(July 31, 2002).
30. See Information Office of the State Council, China's National Defense in 2002 (Dec.
9, 2002), availableat http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20021209/index.htm.
31. See Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of NonTraditional Security Issues, Nov. 4, 2002, availableat http://www.aseansec.org/13186.htm.
32. Jiang Zemin, President, P.R.C., Address at German Foreign Policy Association:
Together Create a New Century of Peace and Prosperity (Apr. 10, 2002).
33. See U.N. Theme Group on HJV/AIDS in China, HIV/AIDS: China's Titanic Peril2001 Update of the AIDS Situation and Needs Assessment Report, at 7 (June 2002),
availableat http://www.hivpolicy.orgfLibrary/HPP000056.pdf.
34. An editorial in the People's Daily warned that if measures were not taken by all
levels of the Chinese government and the Chinese people in general, the number of HIV
cases could reach 10 million by 2010, causing RMB7.7 trillion in economic losses. Yang
Ruoqian, Editorial, Curbing AIDS Proliferation,No Time for China to Delay Any Longer,
PEOPLE'S DAiLY, July 24, 2002, available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/
200207/24/eng20020724_100289.shtml.
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The shift to a new security agenda is not simply a technical issue; it
also leads to the reorientation of the national development agenda.
Many nontraditional security challenges, such as the spread of
infectious disease, are nonmilitary in nature but pose direct threats to
the safety of societies and individuals, and thus fall under the category
of "human security."35 The focus on the welfare and quality of peoples'
lives as the primary object of security was emphasized by former
Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy, who made it clear that
"[flrom a foreign policy perspective, human security is best understood
as a shift in perspective or orientation. It is an alternative way of seeing
the world, taking people as its point of reference rather than focusing
36
exclusively on the security of territory or governments."
According to a Chinese scholar, the rise of "human security" and the
people-centered approach it entails also called for a broad restructuring
of state-society relations. He used the cases of Iraq under Saddam
Hussein and Indonesia under Suharto to argue that "national security"
was the least secure if pursued at the expense of human security and
social stability. 37 He further argued that NTS problems are often
associated with the legitimacy and effectiveness of a country's
sociopolitical system. Most of China's NTS problems "are rooted in the
inadequacy of the economic structure and political system, and often
spread and deteriorate because of power holders' bureaucratic selfassertiveness and indifference." 38 Indeed, prior to the SARS outbreak,
39
public health had become the least of Chinese leaders' concerns.
The leadership transition from November 2002 increased the
incentives of a new generation of leaders to strike a theme different
from their predecessors. In March 2003, the Party General Secretary
Hu Jintao indicated his emphasis on human security by promising to
"exercise power for the people, feel as the people feel and work for their
happiness." 40 This people-centered approach gained more currency after
35. See Roland Paris, Human Security: ParadigmShift or Hot Air?, 26 INT'L SECURITY
87, 96-97 (2001) (explaining that "human security" can serve as a broad label for studies in
the field of security issues that is primarily concerned with nonmilitary threats to the
safety of individuals, groups, and societies).
36. Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canadian Dep't of Foreign Aff. & Int'l
Trade, Concept Paper, Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World (April 29,
1999), available at http://www.summit-americas.org/CanadalHumansecurity-english.htm.
37. Wang Yizhou, China and Non-Traditional Security, GuoJI JINGJI PINGLUN [REV.
INT'L ECON.], Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 34.
38. Id. at 35.
39. RUAN MING, DENG XIAOPING: CHRONICLE OF AN EMPIRE 189 (Nancy Liu et al.

trans., Westview Press 1994) (1992).
40. People's Daily Online, Hu Jintao Addresses NPC Session Closing Ceremony,

http://engish.peopledaily.com.cn/200303/18/eng20O3O318_113472.shtml
8, 2009).

(last visited Oct.
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China's initial response to the SARS outbreak turned out to be a fiasco,
which prepared a favorable political environment for policy changes in
addressing NTS threats in general, and public health challenges in
particular.
In sum, market-oriented reforms and the end of the Cold War
opened a window of opportunity for China to redefine its role in the
international system. The constructivist attempts to become a
responsible status quo power were accompanied by new thinking on the
meaning and scope of security, which changed the discourse of foreign
policy. The growing interest in NTS issues, coupled with the rhetoric of
a people-centered approach to development, began to alter the
landscape in which the health-foreign policy would operate in the new
century.
IV. CHINA'S SARS DIPLOMACY

A. SARS as a ForeignPolicy Challenge
The streams of problems, politics, and policy ideas alive in Chinese
foreign policy at the turn of the century converged during the 2002-03
SARS outbreak. 41 The crisis highlighted the potential devastating
impact of health-related NTS threats. The SARS epidemic lasted less
than eight months and killed no more than 700 people in China, but it
shaved an estimated seven-tenths of a percentage point off China's
gross domestic product for 2003, and probably caused the most serious
social-political crisis since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown.
In addition, SARS occurred when China had made great strides in
improving its international image. The misgivings among the
international community about China's initial handling of the crisis led
to calls to "quarantine China" by suspending all travel links with the
country until it implemented a transparent public health campaign. 42
During the crisis, 110 out of the 164 countries with which China had
diplomatic relations placed at least some restrictions on travel to
China. 43 As the official China Daily admitted, "The hard-won mutual
trust between China and the international community was put to the
test."44 Moreover, the spread of SARS and furor over China's
41. Yanzhong Huang, The Politics of HIV/AIDS in China, 30 ASIAN PERSP. 95, 95-125
(2006).
42. Editorial, QuarantineChina, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2003, at A10.
43. Embassy of Switz., ChinaBusiness Briefing No. 140 (May 12-18, 2003), available at
http://www.sinoptic.ch/cbb/2003/cbb030512-030518.htm.
44. Pang Zhongying, Opinion, China Shows It Is Responsible, CHINA DAILY, June 30,
2003, at 4, availableat http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/do/2003-06/30/
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mismanagement of the crisis expanded the rift between China and
Taiwan. Taipei seized the opportunity to portray China as an
irresponsible power that exports epidemics to Taiwan, yet refuses to
allow Taiwan to seek direct help from WHO. The Health Minister of
Taiwan even launched a notorious advertisement comparing the
number of SARS cases to the number of communist spies hiding in
45
Taiwan.
In recognition of both domestic and foreign policy challenges arising
out of the SARS crisis, Premier Wen Jiabao said that "the health and
security of the people, overall state of reform, development, and
stability, and China's national interest and international image are at
stake."46 Against this background, arguments about the negative
downward spiral between infectious diseases, economic growth, socialpolitical stability, and national security gained more currency in
Chinese academic and policy circles. As a Chinese scholar noted, more
attention should now be paid to NTS threats, which cover not just
terrorism, but also security in social fields such as communicable
disease. 47 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) echoed this opinion:
In the initial stages of SARS epidemic, we did not
handle it as a non-traditional security factor in the
context of globalization .... The epidemic and related
information had already spread before effective control
methods were found. We did not turn around the passive
situation in disease prevention and control as well as
diplomacy work until the [Party] center adopted decisive
48
measures.

content_241840.htm.
45. SARS shi feidie? Weishu guanggao xiu guotou [Is SARS a Communist Spy?
Ministry of Health Ad Overblown], LIANHE BAO [UNITED DAILY NEWS] (Taiwan), Apr. 1,
2003.
46. Tongyi sixiang, jiaqiang lingdao, luoshi zeren, qieshi zuohao feidianxing feiyan
fangzhi gongzuo [Reaching a Common Understanding, Strengthening Leadership,
Carrying Out Responsibilities, Feasibly Completing SARS Prevention and Treatment
Work], PEOPLE'S DAILY, Apr. 14, 2003, at 1, availableat http://www.people.com.cn/GB/
paper464/8941/834197.html.
47. Pang Zhongyin, Weinan zhong chongsu Zhongguo guoji xingxiang [Reshaping
China's International Image Amidst Crisis], WANGLUO BAO [NETWORK DAILY] (P.R.C),
June 23, 2006, at 10.
48. Waijiaobu zhengce yanjiushi [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Policy Lab.], Waijiao:
zouxiang kaifang, tourning yu hezuo [Diplomacy: Towards Openness, Transparency and
Cooperation], SHIIE ZHISHI [WORLD AFF.], issue no. 12, 2003, at 12 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter
MOFA].

PURSUING HEALTH AS FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE OF CHINA

117

In November 2003, MOFA convened a special meeting to examine
NTS threats, and, for the first time, HIV/AIDS was listed as one of the
six NTS threats. 49 In December 2003, the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, a major government think tank, organized a national
conference on NTS, the first of its kind in China. In view of the threat
SARS posed to China, some participants went as far as to suggest that
50
human security should be the foundation of Chinese national security.
B. Wrestling with WHO
The SARS crisis not only led to the "securitization" of infectious
disease in Chinese policy circles, but it also provided China with the
opportunity to update its ideas about globalization and the role of
international organizations. Fearing that the pro-independence
authorities in Taiwan might exploit the epidemic to dissociate Taiwan
from the mainland, China sought to control WHO's communication with
and reporting on Taiwan. WHO initially did follow Beijing's demands.
When the first cases appeared in Taiwan in March 2003, WHO asked
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to send
experts rather than having WHO deal directly with Taiwan's
problems. 51 In early May, however, as Taiwan reported the rapid spread
of SARS, WHO decided, for the first time, to send an advisory team of
its own to Taiwan. Later, two additional WHO experts were dispatched.
Before sending the advisory team, the health agency did seek approval
from Beijing. 52 Although Beijing reacted rapidly and positively to
WHO's requests, it worried that doing so risked emboldening the island
to seek more international political space. When meeting with WHO
Director-General Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland on May 18, Vice-Premier
Wu Yi warned WHO against Taiwan's efforts to "politicize" the SARS
crisis. 53 In mid-June, however, WHO invited two speakers from Taiwan
49. Wang, supra note 37, at 63 (listing the other 5 NTS threats aside from HIV/AIDS
as money trafficking, piracy, excessive poverty, refugees and immigrants, and
environmental security).
50. See He Zhongyi, 'Feichuantonganquan yu Zhongguo" xueshu yantaohui zongshu
["Non-traditionalSecurity and China" An Overview of the Academic Symposium], SHIJIE
JINGJI YU ZHENGZHI [WORLD ECON. & POL.], issue no. 3, 2004, at 48, 52 (P.R.C.).
51. David G. Brown, China-Taiwan Relations: The Shadow of SARS, COMP.
CONNECTIONS, July 2003, 9, available at http://www.csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/
0302qchina taiwan.pdf.
52. Interview with Dr. David Heymann, Assistant Director-General for Health
Security and Environment, WHO, March 10, 2009.
53. See Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi Meets WHO Chief, RENMIN RIBAO (Beijing), May
19, 2003, availableat http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200305/19/
eng20030519_116894.shtml (English translation).
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to present at its global conference on SARS in Malaysia. Taiwan hailed
the invitation as a "breakthrough" in its bid to join WHO. 54 Beijing
stated that it had shown flexibility by agreeing to Taiwan's
participation, although the WHO spokesman said that the invitations
had been extended without reference to Beijing.55 Much to Beijing's
chagrin, the name badge of Taiwan's senior representative at the
meeting identified him as "Director, CDC, Taiwan," without mention of
56
China.
Beijing initially also fought hard with WHO for its monopoly over
disease control and response activities during the epidemic in mainland
China. Until early April, the Chinese government was essentially in
denial, sharing little information with WHO and even barring WHO
experts from visiting Guangdong, the SARS epicenter. But each step
taken by Beijing to reaffirm its sovereignty only generated more
pressure for international scrutiny of its domestic health system, and
justified more autonomous actions by WHO. On April 2, 2003, WHO
issued the first travel advisory in its fifty-five-year history, advising
people not to visit Hong Kong and Guangdong. Two weeks later,
Beijing's spin control suffered another setback, when WHO took the
unprecedented step of issuing a very public rebuke of China's actions,
chastising Beijing for misleading the global community regarding the
true extent of SARS infection throughout the country.57
When the Chinese leaders realized that their strategy of containing
SARS only jeopardized its image as a responsible player in the
international system, they tried to accommodate WHO demands in the
anti-SARS campaign. Ironically, each concession from Beijing to satisfy
WHO demands only strengthened WHO's authority and power to push
for further concessions, so much so that WHO representatives were
viewed as de facto supervisors of China's anti-SARS campaign. 58 As
observed by a Chinese scholar, during the SARS crisis WHO was as
famous as the World Trade Organization in China because the Chinese
people recognized the "indispensable authority" of WHO in global health
affairs.5 9 By all accounts, WHO acted more like a referee rather than a
junior partner in China's fight against SARS.

54. Melody Chen, SARS Team Ready for WHO Meet, TAIPEI TIMES, June 16, 2003, at 1,
available at http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2003/06/162003055430.
55. Brown, supranote 51, at 11.
56. Id.
57. John Pomfret, Underreporting, Secrecy Fuel SARS in Beijing, WHO Says, WASH.
POST, Apr. 17, 2003, at A16.
58. Simon Shen, The "SARS Diplomacy" of Beijing and Taipei: Competition Between
the Chinese and Non-Chinese Orbits, 28 ASIAN PERSP. 45, 49 (2004).
59. Pang, supra note 47.

PURSUING HEALTH AS FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE OF CHINA

119

On June 24, 2003, WHO lifted its travel warning for Beijing. The
city's residents greeted the decision with enormous celebrations and
relief. A statement from the official China National Tourism Association
viewed the removal of WHO's warning as "a vote of confidence in our
war on SARS and an important starting point for the recovery of
China's tourism sector."60 During SARS, even one of the most ardent
supporters of state sovereignty appeared to have acquiesced to WHO's
leadership in international health governance. No wonder Fidler argued
that the SARS outbreak put the final nail61in the coffin of relying on
traditional strategies for health governance.
C. Wen Jiabao'sSARS Diplomacy
The global spread of SARS and its foreign policy ramifications
reinforced the perception of China as a stakeholder in the international
system, generating strong incentives for China to deal with
international cooperation in a more active and sincere manner. On April
26, 2003, Health Ministers of ASEAN+3 (ASEAN members plus China,
Japan, and South Korea) met in Kuala Lumpur to voice their
willingness to cooperate on health issues. Four days later, Premier Wen
attended an emergency summit meeting with ASEAN leaders in
Bangkok. According to the then Thai Premier Thaksin, it did not take
long for Premier Wen to confirm his attendance.
Against the backdrop of the cross-boundary spread of SARS, Wen
emphasized that the disease could "only be effectively countered by

cooperative efforts at the regional and international levels." 62 Keenly
aware that China's image and the reputation of the new leadership were
at stake, Wen was very open, candid, and cooperative at the Bangkok
meeting. He pleaded for understanding from other ASEAN leaders by

stating: "[Iln the face of the outbreak of this sudden epidemic, we lack
experience with its prevention and control. The crisis management
mechanism and the work of certain localities and departments are not
quite adequate." 63 This statement constituted an astonishing admission
of culpability from a regime that was loath to take responsibility for any

60. Paul Zach, SARS-Free Asia Goes All Out to Woo Tourists Back, THE STRAITS TIMES
(Singapore), June 26, 2003, available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edulcontent/sars-free-asiagoes-all-out-woo-tourists-back.
61. David P. Fidler, Germs, Governance, and Global Public Health in the Wake of
SARS, 113 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 799, 801-02 (2004).
62. Wen Jiabao, Premier, P.R.C., Speech at the Special China-ASEAN Leaders'
Meeting on SARS (Apr. 29, 2003), 1 13, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/
topics/zgcydyhz/t26292.htm#.
63. Id. at T 3.
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mistake or wrongdoing. In the ASEAN-China joint statement, China
agreed to "associate itself with the measures proposed by the ASEAN
declaration." The seemingly half-hearted endorsement was indeed
remarkable, given that a total acceptance of the measures decided by
the ASEAN leaders would be perceived in China as an act of
submission.64 To demonstrate its commitment to cooperation with
ASEAN countries, China proposed the creation of a special fund against
SARS. It pledged initial seed money of U.S.$1.2 million, which was
followed by donations from Thailand and Cambodia. 65
Ultimately, the Bangkok Summit proved to be a win-win outcome
for both China and Southeast Asia. For leaders in Southeast Asia, the
health crisis reinvigorated ASEAN and served to equalize its relations
with China. China, on the other hand, took advantage of the new
dynamics created by the Summit to expand its influence in this region.
In October 2003, China became the first ever "strategic partner" of
ASEAN, which was seen as a victory over the suspicions that ASEAN
members had long harbored toward China because of territorial
disputes and ideological conflicts. 66 In Singaporean Prime Minister Goh
Chok Tong's words, the SARS crisis "may be the start of a new
relationship between leaders in East Asia."67
V. THE NEW HEALTH-FOREIGN POLICY DYNAMICS IN CHINA

A. A More Transparentand Cooperative China
Under the punctuated equilibrium model, institutions are
established in spurts: their structures, once established, tend to persist
until the next crisis brings about a new spurt of institutional
reconfiguration. 68 Despite the tendency to get back to "business as
usual," the SARS-induced policy and institutional innovations within
China have largely been sustained. A joint declaration signed by
ASEAN and China in Bali in October 2003, for instance, not only
reiterated the determination of both sides to implement the consensus
64. Michael Vatikiotis, ASEAN and China - United in Adversity, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
May 8, 2003, at 14, 15.
65. Id. at 16.
66. Susan Lawrence, Testing Wen's Mettle, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 11, 2003, at 34, 37.
67. Vatikiotis, supra note 64, at 17.
68. Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONS 142, 154 (James G. March ed., 1965). On the episodic nature of
institutional change, see G. John Ikenberry, Conclusion: An Institutional Approach to
American Foreign Economic Policy, in THE STATE AND AMERICAN FOREIGN ECONOMIC
POLICY 219 (G. John Ikenberry et al. eds., 1988); Stephen Krasner, Sovereignty: An
InstitutionalPerspective, 21 COMP. POL. STUD. 66 (1988).
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of the Special ASEAN-China Leaders' Meeting on SARS held in
Bangkok the previous April, but it also promised to launch the "ten plus
one" (ASEAN members plus China) health ministers meeting
mechanism. The growing interest in international cooperation over
health has been driven by an important lesson Beijing drew from SARS:
in an age of globalization, it can no longer monopolize information or act
alone in addressing NTS challenges. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
acknowledged this reality as follows:
Nontraditional security problems often go beyond the
capability and jurisdiction of one single government. A
government in the era of globalization is no longer an
"omnipotent government," and its monopoly over
information has been broken. Therefore, in dealing with
a crisis, the government not only should first consider
issuing warnings in a timely manner to its nationals,
foreign residents as well as related countries that are
likely harmed and affected, but should also actively seek
international assistance and undertake international
cooperation in order to strengthen its capability to
address internal crises. Only by adopting such
responsible and candid attitude can government's
trustworthiness and cohesion be strengthened for the
benefit of dealing with crises appropriately and reducing
losses. 69
Driven by this new thinking, China in the wake of SARS has been
more willing to work with other countries on health issues. The 2003
Regulation on Public Health Emergencies (Article 7), the 2004 revised
Law on Infectious Disease Prevention and Control (Article 8), and the
2007 Emergency Response Law (Article 17) all authorize government
support of international cooperation on disease surveillance and
response. China has also expanded its cooperation with other countries
on a bilateral basis in disease prevention and control. Since 2002, it has
established high-level health dialogue mechanisms with ASEAN, the
United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Japan. In 2004, China
organized the China-ASEAN special meeting on the control of avian
influenza, which committed all parties to implement the meeting's
recommendations. The same year, the annual U.S.-China Global Issues
Forum began to provide a platform to discuss issues such as
humanitarian assistance, public health, trafficking in persons,
69. MOFA, supranote 48, at 13.
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environmental conservation, and sustainable development. In 2006, the
presidents of China and the United States agreed to create a Strategic
Economic Dialogue (SED) to discuss long-term strategic challenges.
Under the SED, dialogues over health and food and drug safety issues
are handled by the (1) U.S.-China Health Care Forum involving the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Chinese
Ministry of Health, and (2) Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade
involving the U.S. Department of Commerce, the U.S. Trade
Representative, and the Chinese Vice Premier responsible for trade.7 0 In
November 2008, amidst the growing concerns about the safety of its
exports to the United States, China allowed the U.S. Food and Drug
71
Administration to open in Beijing its first overseas office.
The SARS crisis also forced the Chinese government to take steps to
establish a more open and transparent government in dealing with
public health issues. As part of the government transparency campaign,
information on current veterinary epidemics, such as foot and mouth
disease, swine vesicular disease, and avian influenza are no longer
classified as state secrets. Mechanisms on communicating with the
international society on public health emergencies have been
established. Beginning in 2004, China has worked with UNAIDS to
issue joint reports on China's AIDS spread and control. China's
increasing candor and pragmatism in tackling AIDS compared more
and more favorably to the approaches of India and Russia, which still
seemed to be in denial.7 2 Following its acceptance of the International
Health Regulations (2005), the Chinese government has also made
important strides in cooperating with WHO and foreign scientists in
sharing data and information about outbreaks. During the 2008 hand,
foot, and mouth disease outbreak, the Ministry of Health disseminated
six information newsletters to health departments in Hong Kong,
Macau, and Taiwan while working closely with WHO on the prevention
and control of the disease.
As China became more sensitive to its international image in
addressing health challenges, it has been increasingly receptive to
international influences and pressures. Following the delivery of only
70. See Joint Communique on the Second Meeting of the U.S.-China Health-Care
Forum (May 22, 2007), available at http://www.export.gov/china/policyadd/
JointCommuniqueHC.pdf.
71. Calum MacLeod, FDA Opens Office in China, USA TODAY, Nov. 19, 2008, available
at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-11-19-chinafdaN.htm.
72. See Joseph Kahn, Business Urged to Help Fight Aids, N.Y. TiMES, March 19, 2005,
available at http://query.nytimes.com/gstfullpage.html?res=9EO2EED9113CF93AA
25750COA9639CB63 (reporting on efforts by the Chinese government to raise awareness
about AIDS and quoting Richard Holbrooke stating that he "would remove China from the
list of countries in denial").
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five strains in 2004, China in November 2005 responded to WHO
pressure and promised to speed the delivery of another twenty avian
influenza virus samples from 2004 and 2005 to support global efforts to
prevent an influenza pandemic. China's response was in sharp contrast
to Indonesia's reaction, which was using the idea of "viral sovereignty"
to justify its failure to cooperate with WHO in avian influenza sample
73
sharing and disease reporting.
The incentive to pay heed to international opinion is particularly
strong when a convincing case could be made that a failure to do so
would tarnish China's international image. The visit of China's AIDS
crusader, Dr. Gao Yaojie, to the United States in 2007 is a good case in
point. She was placed under house arrest as she was leaving for Beijing
to pick up a U.S. travel visa so she could attend a banquet to be held in
her honor by a nonprofit group whose honorary chairwoman was
Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton. However, after Senator Clinton
brought her case to President Hu and Vice Premier Wu Yi, the Chinese
government, apparently wanting to assuage international criticism,
74
relented and granted permission to her visit to the United States.
B. GrowingInterest in Multilateralism
Beginning in the early 1990s, as part of its search for an effective
approach to allay the fear of the rapidly rising Chinese power, Beijing
increasingly turned to multilateralism in its foreign policy. 75 According
to a Chinese scholar, Beijing's participation in multilateral
international institutions and efforts to undertake broad multilateral
diplomacy is "the most lively and most active component of Chinese
diplomacy. '76 The change is evident in its growing participation in
multilateral arrangements on international health cooperation at
global, regional, and subregional levels (see Table 2). At the global level,
China has demonstrated strong interest in working closely with major
international organizations in disease prevention and control. In
January 2006, China hosted an International Pledging Conference on
73. Richard Holbrooke & Laurie Garrett, 'Sovereignty' That Risks Global Health,
WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2008, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyncontent
article/2008/08/08/AR2008080802919_pf.html.
74. Benjamin Kang Lim, Freed China AIDS Activist Off to U.S., REUTERS, Feb. 25,
2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSPEK19911220070225.
75. See generally CHINA TURNS TO MULTILATERALISM: FOREIGN POLICY AND REGIONAL

SECURITY (Guoguang Wu & Helen Lansdowne eds., 2008).
76. Su Changhe, Zhoubian zhidu yu zhoubian zhuyi-Dongya quyu zhili zhong de
Zhongguo tujing [Zhoubian Institutions and Zhoubianism: China's Approach to
Governance in East Asia], SHIJIE JINGJI YU ZHENGZHI [WORLD ECON. & POL.], issue no. 1,

2006, at 12.
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Avian and Human Influenza, which it cosponsored with the European
Commission and the World Bank. The Chinese Foreign Minister, rather
than the Health Minister, sent out the invitations for this conference.
Representatives from more than one hundred countries around the
world and representatives of international technical and financing
agencies, organizations, the private sector, and civil society attended the
meeting. During this event, the international community pledged
U.S.$1.9 billion in financial support, including U.S.$10 million from
China.
Even compared to its increased participation at the global level,
China appears to be more active in participating in regional platforms,
including the ASEAN+3 Summit, the East Asia Summit, and the Asia
Europe Meeting (ASEM).7 7 Through these venues, China proposed a
series of important initiatives on the control of avian flu and the
management of public health emergencies. In addition, China has
worked with the other five countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion
(GMS) in an attempt to institutionalize coordinated surveillance and
response to infectious diseases, such as avian influenza. It sponsored
the Greater Mekong Six-Nation Ministerial Meeting on Disease
Surveillance Cooperation Project and also hosted the second GMS Public
Health Forum in 2009.78
Table 2. China's Multilateral Cooperation in Health
Level

Venue

China's Contribution

Global

U.N., WHO, World Bank,
UNESCO

Regional

APEC (Health Working
Group), ASEM (Health
Cluster), ASEAN+3,
ASEAN Regional Forum,
SCO, East Asia Summit,
Asia Cooperation

-Helped revise IHR (2005);
-Hosted and cosponsored International
Pledging Conference on Avian and Human
Influenza (2006).
-Proposed an ASEM initiative on the
management of public health emergencies
(2003);
-Hosted the third ACD, which vowed to
establish a regional disease and epidemic
database and emergency medical

77. This is consistent with the finding that China's multilateralism is still more
regional than global. See Guoguang Wu, Multiple Levels of Multilateralism: The Rising
China in the Turbulent World, in CHINA TURNS TO MULTILATERALISM, supra note 75, at
267, 287.
78. See generally Yang Ronggang, Woguo duiwai weisheng jiaoliu yu hezuo jiaqiang
[Strengthening Our Country's ForeignHealth Exchange and Cooperation], JIANKANG BAo
[HEALTH NEWS] (P.R.C.), Dec. 20, 2001, at 1 (describing China's emerging international
links in foreign health exchange).
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assistance system (2004);
-Proposed to make the management of
public health emergencies a key area for
10+3 cooperation (2005);
-Proposed to host the ASEM Workshop
on Avian Influenza Control in 2007 (2006);
-Proposed that a regional disease
monitoring network be set up to enhance
the capacity of East Asian countries to
respond to public health emergencies
(2007).
Initiated the forum in 2005 and hosted the
forum in 2009.

C. DirectInvolvement of Top Leaders
Beginning with Premier Wen Jiabao's SARS diplomacy in 2003, top
government leaders themselves were directly involved in China's health
diplomacy. In 2005, Premier Wen suggested deepening the ASEAN+3
mechanism by making the handling of public health emergencies a
priority. He also proposed that a ten plus one seminar on post-disaster
disease prevention be held under the China-ASEAN Fund for Public
Health. In September 2005, President Hu and President Bush
hammered out the "Ten Core Principles" of global pandemic response,
which were later supported by eighty-eight nations and agencies. 79 On
May 6, 2009, Hu personally called President Obama to discuss the
spread of H1N1 influenza. Even though the United States had only two
H1N1 fatalities at that time, Hu expressed his "sincere condolences"
and the desire to "maintain communication with the World Health
Organization, the United States, and other relevant parties, as well as
strengthen cooperation, to jointly deal with this challenge to human
health and safety." s0
The engagement of the top Chinese leaders in health diplomacy has
not been confined to making phone calls or initiating new projects. In
2006, Chinese leaders led a successful campaign to elect Margaret Chan
79. Responding to the Threat of Global, Virulent Influenza: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on ForeignRelations, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) (testimony of Laurie A. Garrett, Senior
Fellow for Global Health, Council on Foreign Relations).
80. Hu Jintao and U.S. President Barack Obama with a Telephone, XINHUA NEWS
[P.R.C], May 6, 2009, availableat http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-05/06/
content_1 1325709_1.htm.
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as the Director-General (DG) of WHO. The decision to support Chan's
candidacy, the campaign strategies, and election outcomes proved their
deftness in using health diplomacy to achieve China's foreign policy
objectives. In June 2006, China nominated Chan (then WHO Assistant
DG) to be the first Chinese candidate running for WHO DG. To many,
Chan was an unexpected choice. A native Hong Kong resident, she was
no part of China's domestic political power structure or diplomatic
missions. She appeared to be less experienced than her prominent
Chinese colleague at WHO, Liu Peilong. In fact, three years ago Beijing
was against her appointment as an assistant director-general. 81
But Chan's Hong Kong identity, together with her liberal
technocratic experience, and her apolitical reputation made her the best
choice for Beijing to "redress its closed-door autocratic image projected
during its own SARS crisis."8 2 After initial hesitation, an ad hoc group
led by the then-Vice President Zeng Qinghong decided to throw China's
support to Chan.8 3 In campaigning for her, China mobilized all its
diplomatic resources. Through phone calls and letters, Foreign Minister
Li Zhaoxin and Health Minister Gao Qiang lobbied hard for Chan. The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs even issued a general mobilization order to
its embassies in the thirty-three countries that served on the WHO
Executive Board, asking them to use various means to campaign for
votes. Meanwhile, President Hu and Premier Wen sent personal
recommendation letters to leaders of most member states of WHO's
Executive Board. President Hu called President Bush to seek U.S.
support.8 4 During the Ministerial Meeting of the Forum on China-Africa
Cooperation (FOCAC) held November 3-5, 2006, Chinese leaders
actively canvassed African votes for Chan. To sweeten the deal,
President Hu promised to double development assistance to Africa for
the next three years and to provide preferential credit to Africa worth
U.S.$5 billion by 2009. These efforts paid off on November 9, when Chan
defeated twelve other candidates to become the first Chinese to head a
major U.N. agency. Chan's representation of China in running for the
position and her successful election not only improved China's public
image in international health, but also served well Beijing's realist
81. See Andrew Jack, Woman in the News: Margaret Chan, FINANCIAL TIMES, May 8,
2009, availableat http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a4fc8e58-3c01-1 lde-acbc-00144feabdcO,
dwpuuid=d7b5a5de-07de-1 lde-8a33-0000779fd2ac.html?nclickcheck=1.

82. Simon Shen, Borrowing the Hong Kong Identity for Chinese Diplomacy:
Implications of Margaret Chan's World Health OrganizationElection Campaign, 81 PAC.
AFF. 361, 370 (2008).
83. Interview with a Beijing University professor (July 10, 2009) (on file with author).

84. See Wang Yunquan, Zhongguo tiezui Sha Zukang [China's Iron-mouthed Sha
Zukang], RENMIN RIBAo HAIWAi BAN [PEOPLE'S DAILY OVERSEAS EDITION] (P.R.C.), Apr.
4, 2007, at 7.
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foreign policy agenda. In the words of President Hu, Chan's victory
"shows that China's international status has improved."85 China,
of
course, gained more than just international recognition of its rising
power. During the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, the government referenced
several times the support of Chan and WHO in justifying its aggressive
response toward the outbreak, while Chan herself refused to criticize
China for its travel and trade restrictions that clearly clash with her
86
agency's advice.

D. Reinvigorated Health Diplomacy in Africa
Africa continues to be a priority of China's health diplomacy. In
2003, nearly eighty-one percent of the Chinese foreign aid medical
personnel were stationed in Africa, where about seventy-two percent of
the countries that have diplomatic relations with China were still
hosting China foreign aid medical teams.8 7 The determination to sustain
China's health diplomacy in Africa was expressed in an official paper
issued by the Chinese government in January 2006.88 By then, China
had sent a total of 16,000 medical personnel to forty-seven African
countries and regions, and served some 240 million people.8 9 At present,
thirty-eight Chinese medical teams are distributed in 108 clinical
stations in Africa. 90
As Chinese President Hu Jintao put it, among all the cooperation
projects between China and Africa, the dispatch of Chinese medical
teams "has the longest history, involves the largest number of countries,

85. Press Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (P.R.C.) (Nov. 30, 2006), available at
http://cn.chinareviewnews.com/do/002/6/0/2/100260242.html?coluid=9&kindid=19l l&do
cid=100260242&mdate=0911123624.
86. See Shan Juan, China 'Did Not Overreact to HIN1 Threat, CHINA DAILY, June 4,
2009, availableat http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-06/04/content8242279.htm; Li
Keqiang, Speech at Beijing H1N1 Conference (Aug. 21, 2009), available at
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2009-08/22/content_324800.htm. For Chan's refusal
to criticize China, see Andrew Jack, supranote 81.
87. Weishengbu guoji hezuosi [Div. of Int'l Cooperation, Ministry of Health], Jiaqiang

shishi xin zhanlue, gaige yuanzhu Feizhou yiliao gongzuo [Strengthening the
Implementation of New Strategy, Reforming Aid-to-Africa Medical Work], XIYA FEIZHOU
[WEST ASIA & AFR.], issue no. 5, 2003, at 15 (P.R.C.).
88. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, China's African Policy
(Jan. 12, 2006), availableat http://chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/zxxx/t230615.htm.

89. Jin Yong, Zhongguo nuyisheng de ' Feizhou qingjie" [Female Chinese Doctor's
'African Complex'], ZHONGGUO FUNU BAo [CHINA WOMEN'S NEWS] (P.R.C.), Nov. 4, 2006,
at 2.

90. Wang Liji, Zhongfei weisheng hezuo jiwang kailai [CarryingForward the Cause of
Sino-African Health Cooperation], GuoJI SHANGBAO [INT'L COM. DAILY] (P.R.C), Nov. 5,
2007, at F3.
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and is the most successful."9 1 Beneficiaries of their services include both
the general public and the "upper class" in recipient countries. 92 In
Zambia, for example, patients of Chinese medical teams included the
President, the Foreign Minister, the Army Commander, and the wife of
the Education Minister. 93 In Sierra Leone, one Chinese doctor allegedly
developed good relations with President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, the Vice
President, and many cabinet ministers. 94 Official media claimed that
the friendship Chinese physicians nurtured with African leaders not
only became an important source of information for the local Chinese
embassy, but also helped project China's "soft power" and achieve its
desired foreign policy objectives, including China's position on human
rights, its bid for the 2008 Olympic games, and its application for WTO
9
membership. 5
Over time, China's cooperation with African countries on health has
increasingly targeted practical grassroots projects that have immediate
benefits for African social and economic well-being. In recognition of the
devastating impact of malaria in Africa, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign
Affairs organized anti-malaria training sessions for thirty-four African
countries. Based on the Chinese-developed anti-malaria drug
Artemisinin and its own experience in combating the disease, China
developed programs of malaria control and treatment within the
FOCAC framework. The objective was to use such projects to improve
the image of Chinese enterprises and establish "all-around cooperation"
96
at government, expert, and enterprise levels.
91. Wang Tian & Wu Wenbin, Hu Jintao qinqie huijian Zhongguo yuanzhu Moluoge
yiliaodui duiyuan [Hu Jintao Personally Meets with Members of China's Moroccan
Foreign-aidMedical Team], PEOPLE'S DAILY, Apr. 27, 2006, at 1.
92. He Tao, Zoujin shenmi de Guangdong yuanfei yiliaodui [Walking into Mystery, the
GuangdongAid-to-Africa Medical Team], GUANGZHOU RIBAo [GUANGDONG DAILY], July 5,
2006.
93. See Dai Xiaobin & Feng Pugang, Qingji Zanbiya-wojun yiliaodui yuanZan zhaji
[Emotional Ties to Zambia-Notes of Our Army's Aid-to-Zambia Medical Team],
JIEFANGJUN JIANKANG [PLA HEALTH], issue no. 6, 1995, at 7-9 (P.R.C.); Li Xianjie & Li
Ling, Zoujin Zanbiya zongtongfu de Henan yisheng [The Henan Doctor Who Walked into
Zambia's PresidentialPalace], ZHONGZHOU TONGZHAN [UNITED FRONT OF HENAN], issue
no. 1, 2003, at 30-31 (P.R.C.) (describing a close relationship developed between a Chinese
foreign aid doctor and the President of Zambia).
94. Luo Manyuan, YuanFei jiahua" "Zhongguo shenyi" [Aid-to-Africa Anecdotes: "A
Divine Chinese Doctor'] XIANG CHAO [HUNAN TIDE], issue no. 2, 2007, at 47-49 (P.R.C.).
95. See generally Bates Gill & Yanzhong Huang, The Sources and Limits of China's
Soft Power, SURVIVAL, Summer 2006, at 17-36 (examining China's increasing soft-power
resources and constraints on China's use of such resources); Lu, supranote 15 (discussing
the benefits in China's international projects coming out of the acclaim for China's foreign
aid programs).
96. Wang Cheng, Zhuazhu jihui, jinjun Feizhou [Seizing Opportunity, the March to
Africa], PEOPLE'S DAILY, Apr. 13, 2004, at 7, availableat http://www.people.com.cn/
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At the Sino-African Summit in November 2006, President Hu
pledged to build thirty hospitals and provide U.S.$37.5 million in grants
to supply Artemisinin and develop thirty malaria prevention and
treatment centers in Africa. In addition to promoting international
development, China's health diplomacy serves another important
governance function of foreign policy: promoting and protecting human
dignity through the provision of humanitarian assistance. 97 China has
also become increasingly interested in applying health diplomacy to
international disaster relief efforts, which are not confined to Africa.
Chinese medical teams were among the first medical aid teams to arrive
after the 2003 earthquakes in Algeria and Iran and after the 2005
98
tsunami in Southeast Asia.
However, Beijing's health diplomacy in Africa is by no means
entirely altruistic. It is also driven by its desire to secure access to
natural resources on the continent. For example, in return for a U.S.$9
billion deal with the Democratic Republic of Congo that would see the
building of infrastructure facilities including thirty-two hospitals and
145 health centers, China would get ten million tons of copper and
400,000 tons of cobalt. 99 But, even with this caveat, it is safe to say that,
especially compared to the 1960s and 1970s, health now features more
prominently in Chinese foreign policy in all four basic functions of
foreign policy, namely, security, economic well-being, international
development, and human dignity.1 00
E. Southeast Asia: A New Regional Priority
Since 2003, China has been actively engaging Southeast Asian
countries in health-related cooperation. In its cooperation with ASEAN
countries, China has focused on combating diseases as a NTS threat,
thereby creating a stable security environment for its economic
development while reassuring regional nations that its rise does not
threaten them. Several unique factors drive the emphasis on NTS
threats in China's cooperation with ASEAN countries. The first is
geographic proximity. According to Barry Buzan et al., security concerns
GB/paper464I11770/1060885.html.

97. David P. Fidler, Health as ForeignPolicy: HarnessingGlobalizationfor Health, 21
HEALTH PROMOTION INT'L 51, 53-54 (2007).

98. See Feng Wei, Guogan jizhi de Zhongguo yiliao jiuyuan diyi bing--fang Zhongguo
guoji jiuyuandui shouxi yiliaoguan, Wujing zongyuan fuyuanzhang Zheng Jingchen
jiaoshou [The Model of China Medical Assistance-Interview with Zheng Jingchen, Chief
Medical Officer, ChinaMedical Assistance International,Vice Presidentof Wujing General
Hospital], ZHONGGUO YIYUAN [CHINESE HOSPITALS], issue no. 11, 2006 (P.R.C.).
99. Nick Mathiason, New Fightfor Congo's Riches, THE OBSERVER, June 29, 2008, at 7.
100. Fidler, supranote 97, at 53-54.
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cluster in regions because such concerns do not travel well over
distances, making it possible to identify "regional security complexes" as
sets of states whose security interests overlap. 10 1 China and Southeast
Asian countries do share a range of public health problems. Altogether,
they account for 91.6 percent of the SARS cases (89.4 percent of
fatalities) and, as of June 2008, 79.5 percent of the human cases of
avian influenza (81.5 percent of fatalities). 10 2 This high concentration of
health-related NTS threats is different from the distribution pattern of
NTS threats in Central Asia/Russia, where the so-called "three forces"
(separatism, terrorism, and extremism) are the main security concerns,
or Northeast Asia, where nuclear nonproliferation dominates the NTS
agenda (see Table 3).103
Of course, the distribution of SARS and avian flu cases is
10 4
asymmetric within ASEAN, and between China and Southeast Asia.
Yet, the openness of their economies and the rapidly developing
economic links between them in terms of tourism, trade, and labor
movements, means that even countries with few to no cases have to deal
with the economic shocks created by the spread of disease in the region.
Economic development in Cambodia and Myanmar, for example,
suffered in 2003 even though they were spared by SARS.
The high level of broadly defined security interdependence set the
dynamics of regional NTS cooperation between China and Southeast
Asia differently from those between China and South Asia. As Table 3
shows, even though both China and India face the threats of HIV/AIDS
and terrorism, a regional security complex has not emerged, in part
because the level of trade interdependence between the two remains
low. In 2003, India's share in China's imports was just 1.03 percent,

101. BARRY BUZAN, OLE WAVER & JAAP DE WILDE, SECURITY: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS 70 (1998).
102. For the distribution of SARS cases, see WHO, Summary of Probable SARS Cases
with Onset of Illness from Nov. 1, 2002 to July 31, 2003, http://www.who.int/csr/sars/
country/table2004_04_21/en/index.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009). For information about
human cases of avian flu, see WHO, Cumulative Number of Confirmed Cases of Avian
Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian-influenza/
country/casestable 2008 06 19/enlindex.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2009).
103. Some Chinese scholars treat nuclear nonproliferation as an NTS challenge. See,
e.g., Liu Qing, Dongya feichuantong anquan [NontraditionalSecurity in East Asia], GuoJI
WENTI
LUNTAN
[INT'L STUD.
F.],
Summer
2007, at 69,
available at
http://www.siis.org.crShYj-Cms/Mgz/200702/2008517163412RQIN.PDF.
104. China alone claimed 87.5 percent of all the SARS cases and 83.7 percent of deaths.
Id. Among ASEAN countries, human cases of avian flu were found mainly in Indonesia
and Vietnam. Id.
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while China's share in India's imports was less than five percent. 105 The
same figures for ASEAN-China trade were 11.5 percent and 7.9 percent,
respectively. 106 The geographic proximity and the relatively high level of
economic interaction and interdependence legitimize the "securitization"
of public health challenges in China's cooperation with Southeast Asia,
which in turn contributed to the building of the "ten plus one"
cooperation framework (see Table 3).
Table 3. China and Regional Cooperation on Nontraditional
Security Threats
Region
Southeast
South Asia
Central Asia
Northeast
Asia
and Russia
Asia
Common
threats

Drug
trafficking;
Infectious
disease
(SARS,
Avian Flu)

Terrorism;
HIV/AIDS

"Three forces"
(terrorism,
separatism,
extremism);
drug
trafficking

Nuclear
proliferation

Interaction
level

High

Low

High

High

Cooperation
mechanism

ASEAN plus
China ("ten
plus one")

None

Shanghai
Cooperation
Organization

Six-Party
Talks

The "ten plus one" framework consists of three levels (see Figure 1).
On the top level is the leadership summit. Launched in 1997, the
summit determines strategic direction of the overall cooperative effort.
At the 2007 summit, Premier Wen Jiabao proposed that a regular
information sharing system be set up to address infectious diseases and
public health emergencies. Below that level are the ministerial
meetings, which provide assistance to the summit. The first health
ministerial meeting was held in 2006. The third level is the working
mechanism, including Senior Officials Consultation (SOC) at the vice105. Biswanath Bhattacharyay & Prabir De, Promotion of Trade and Investment
Between P.R.C. and India: Toward a Regional Perspective, ASIAN DEV. REV. (2005),
availableat http://findarticles.com/plarticles/mi-qa5498is_2005011ain21364220.
106. ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS: REALITIES AND PROSPECTS 14 (Saw Swee-Hock et al.
eds., 2005); WTO, World Merchandise Imports by Region (2003), http://www.wto.org/
english/rese/statis-e/its2004_e/section3_e/iiiO2.xls (last visited Oct. 11, 2009).
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ministerial level and the ASEAN-China Joint Cooperation Committee
(ACJCC). While SOC is entrusted with discussing China-ASEAN
relations and other international and regional issues, ACJCC is
responsible for coordinating overall cooperation. In March 2005, China
proposed to include public health and four other areas as priorities for
cooperation, which the SOC endorsed in April.
In addition to the three-level mechanisms, there are supporting
arrangements including think tanks, conferences, and governmentsponsored funds. For example, the China-ASEAN Eminent Persons
Group (CAEPG), composed of retired senior government officials,
proposed in 2005 to hold China-ASEAN Ministerial Meetings on newly
emerging infectious diseases. China also expressed its willingness to
host a symposium on the progress of prevention and control of human
cases of highly pathogenic avian influenza. China and ASEAN have
established the "China-ASEAN Public Health Fund" to finance the
health-related activities and projects. In short, under the ten-plus-one
mechanism, efforts have been made to establish regular information
sharing and cooperative disease surveillance and control systems on
communicable diseases and public health emergencies.
Figure 1. Level of ASEAN-plus-China Cooperation Mechanism
over Health
Leadership Summit

Foreign Mi.sters'.Meeting...

Senor Officials Consultation

............ Health Ministers' Meeting

t CJoitCoperation Committee (ACJCC)

Think tanks (e.g.,

Conferences and forums

Public Health Fund and

CAEPG)

(e.g., Boao Forum of Asia)

other special funds

VI. DILEMMAS AND DANGERS
In justifying U.S. support for global health in its foreign policy,
Jordan S. Kassalow offered three rationales: narrow self-interest,
enlightened self-interest, and humanitarian interests, and concluded

PURSUING HEALTH AS FOREIGN POLICY: THE CASE OF CHINA

133

that only by blending these approaches would the United States play its
appropriate role in promoting global health. 0 7 However, these objectives
are not always reconcilable. As the following case studies show, when
public health issues cascade across its foreign policy agendas, China is
bedeviled by some intractable dilemmas and constraints.
A. Global Health vs. State Sovereignty
One of the main challenges China faces in handling health as a
foreign policy issue is to find the proper balance between the traditional
emphasis on state sovereignty and universalist ambitions inherent in
addressing the global spread of infectious diseases. Noting that SARS
spread to twenty-seven countries in four months, Heymann and Rodier
argued that "inadequate surveillance and response capacity in a single
country can endanger national populations and the public health
security of the entire world."' 08 This reality led former WHO DG Lee
Jong-wook to conclude that "[wie cannot afford any gap in our global
surveillance and response network."'0 9 Prior to the revision of the IHR
in 2005, however, the reporting of disease outbreaks and the nature of
responses to them was solely the domain of sovereign states. The
problem is that states have incentives to suppress the flow of
information regarding endogenous epidemics, which typically generate
strong negative effects upon the economy and society of affected
countries.
Worse, laboratory and epidemiological capacities remain weak in
the developing world, where the greatest number of new pathogens has
been diagnosed over the past two decades. This gap in global
surveillance and response led to the revisions of the IHR in 2005, which
radically changed the way the world would handle reporting and
responses to public health emergencies of international concern. 110 By
allowing WHO to consider reports from nonstate sources, and by
making it mandatory for states to cooperate with WHO in disease
surveillance and control, the revised IHR deprived states of the
exclusive privilege to report and respond to infectious diseases occurring
107. JORDAN S. KAssALow, WirY HEALTH IS IMPORTANT TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
(Council on Foreign Relations 2001), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/8315/
why-healthis important to_us-foreign-policy.html.

108. David L. Heymann & Gu6na6l Rodier, Global Surveillance, National Surveillance,
and SARS, 10 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 173, 173 (2004).

109. Lee Jong-wook, Dir. Gen., WHO, Address at the 57th World Health Assembly (May
17, 2004), availableat http:/www.who.intdg/lee/speeches/2004/wha57/enindex.html.

110. For an overview of the radical changes made in the IHR in 2005, see David P.
Fidler, From International Sanitary Conventions to Global Health Security: The New
InternationalHealth Regulations, 4 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 325 (2005).
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on their territories. Moreover, the revised IHR introduced the principle
of universal application "for the protection of all people of the world
from the international spread of disease." '' Under this principle, even
political entities that are not WHO members should not be excluded
from the WHO global disease control network.
In recognition of the global nature of infectious disease and its
initial mishandling of the SARS crisis, Beijing became more responsible
and cooperative during the late stages of the anti-SARS campaign.
Despite the increasingly assertive role of WHO, Beijing did not complain
about the latter's interference in its internal affairs. China also gave a
green light to WHO experts to have direct contact with Taiwan, even
though it insisted that Beijing was the only legitimate government
representing China and that Taiwan was part of China. China also
demonstrated flexibility in the revision of the IHR, especially with
regard to the inclusion of the universal application principle." 2 In 2005,
China signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with WHO in
which it agreed that Taiwanese medical experts could enjoy "meaningful
participation" in WHO-related activities.
But when universal application became a key facet of Taiwan's
diplomatic campaign for formal WHO membership, China viewed those
actions as a potential threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In negotiating the revision of IHR, China's chief negotiator, a veteran
diplomat, made it clear that "health is a very important issue, but
sovereignty and territorial integrity are more important to a sovereign
state. China will firmly defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity
at all cost." 113 Playing China's sheer population size as a trump card, he
further warned that "the future IHR has no universality without
China's participation."'1 14 Insisting that the principle of "universal
application" should not undermine the sovereignty of WHO member
states, China pushed for the incorporation of additional principles such
as "respecting sovereignty of all countries" and "abiding by the United
Nations Charter and the World Health Organization (WHO)
Constitution."
While allowing WHO to interact with Taiwan, the implementation
of the 2005 MOU set out clear restrictive procedures on such contact.
Among others, the invitation of Taiwanese health experts or dispatch of

111. WHO, International Health Regulations, at 10 (2005), available at
http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/IHR_2005_en.pdf.
112. Interview with a senior Swiss health official (Mar. 10, 2009) (on file with author).
113. Ambassador Sha Zukang, Statement regarding the "International Health
Regulations" Amendments to the Working Group Closing Plenary Session (Nov. 12, 2004),
http://www.china-un.ch/chn/gjhyfy/hy2004/t172226.htm.
114. Id.
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WHO experts to Taiwan should be justified from "both a technical and
policy point of view" and must obtain the approval of the Chinese
Ministry of Health. 115 In January 2008, China had the WHO Executive
Board pass its proposed amendment reaffirming the sovereignty
principle, thereby nullifying a pro-Taiwan proposal that would have
amended a draft resolution on IHR implementation to emphasize the
16
principle of universality.
Beijing's insistence on sovereignty and territorial integrity
effectively raised the bar for Taiwan's WHO entry. Since 1997, Taiwan
has been trying to become an observer in the World Health Assembly,
the supreme decision making body of WHO. But the bid failed every
time because of opposition by China, which maintained that Taiwan
was part of its territory and only sovereign states could join the
organization. Beijing's recalcitrance over Taiwan's participation
nevertheless was seen as heartless hostility toward Taiwan. Proindependent leaders were quick to point out how China's blockage of
WHO assistance to Taiwan was responsible for the spread of infectious
diseases on the island. 117
The issue embittered the atmosphere of cross-strait relations, and
played into the hands of Taiwanese pro-independence leader President
Chen Shui-bian, generating strong popular support and international
sympathy for his efforts to expand Taiwan's international space. In this
context, Beijing's opposition made China look like "a real bully" in front
of the world's health ministers.11 8 Frustrated that Taiwan's twentythree million people could not get the observer status at WHO that was
held by the Vatican, Liechtenstein, and the Order of Malta, the U.S.
Congress geared up its support for Taiwan's participation in WHO.
Under strong congressional pressure, President George W. Bush in
November 2003 sent Chen a rare personal letter pledging support for
Taiwan to be accorded WHO observer status. The tensions between
Beijing's claim as an effective regime representing all Chinese
territories and its inability to cover all Chinese people living within its
sphere of influence, thus, undercut China's ability to project its "soft
power," especially with regard to Taiwan.

115. WHO, Implementation of the Memorandum of UnderstandingBetween the WHO
Secretariatand China, at 4 (July 12, 2005).
116. ROC Cent. News Agency, WHO Board Passes Chinese Amendment to IHR-Related
Bill (Jan. 23, 2008), availableat http://www.globalsecurity.orgtwmd/library/news/taiwan/
2008/taiwan-080123-cna0l.htm.
117. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., SARS FurorHeightens Taiwan-ChinaRift, N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 2003, at A8.
118. See id.

136

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

Although Beijing insists that sovereignty is nonnegotiable, what it
claims is not de facto but de jure sovereignty. This difference explains
why its tough stand on Taiwan's participation as a WHO observer
changed after the newly elected Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou
acknowledged the so-called "92-Consensus" reached by both sides in
1992. Featuring the "One China Principle," the consensus satisfies
China's nominal sovereignty concern even though that principle is
subject to different interpretation by both sides. Against the backdrop of
the recent thaw in cross-strait relations, China offered to lift its
objections to the island's participation in world bodies, which paved the
way for Taiwan to become an observer at the World Health Assembly in
May 2009.119
B. Human Security vs. TraditionalSecurity
When a health problem is framed as a human security challenge,
international cooperation to address the problem is expected because, by
definition, human security transcends the traditional security dilemma
that treats states as competitors whose interactions are always of a
zero-sum nature. 120 In the case of China, government leaders have
become more interested in international health cooperation largely
because they see diseases as a NTS threat that could harm the national
economy, the apparatus of governance, and China's international image.
In other words, although China has realized that strategies of self-help
are doomed to failure in containing the spread of infectious diseases, it
is motivated to action primarily by its narrow self-interest. This
cognition-action gap is complicated by the fact that many transnational
and nonmilitary NTS threats, including infectious disease, are
frequently interwoven with traditional security threats that are biased
toward states, their competition, and their concern with relative
gains. 121 Of course, if each state adopts a state-centric view in assessing
the threats posed by infectious diseases, differences in interest
articulation inevitably lead to competitive dynamics between nations to
the detriment of global health.
This dilemma is particularly a problem in China's cooperation with
Southeast Asia, where health challenges are intertwined with the
traditional "security dilemma." Unlike Europe, Asian countries in the
119. Xie Yu, Taiwan Gets Observer Status at WHA, CHINA DAILY, May 19, 2009, at 8.
120. JENNIFER BLOWER & PETER CHALK, RAND CORP., THE GLOBAL THREAT OF NEW AND
REEMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES: RECONCILING US NATIONAL SECURITY WITH PUBLIC

HEALTH POLICY 6 (2003).
121. See SUSAN L. CRAIG, CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF TRADITIONAL AND NONTRADITIONAL
SECURITY THREATS 101-29 (2007); see also BLOWER & CHALK, supra note 120.
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region still lack a strong collective regional identity because of the
heterogeneity in cultures and variations in the level of social, economic,
and political developments. This "identity gap" in Southeast Asia makes
it difficult to reach consensus because it incurs higher transaction costs
of cooperation, defined by Williamson as including the ex ante costs of
drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement, and the ex post
costs of haggling, costs of governance, and bonding costs to secure
commitments.122

The transaction cost is raised even higher by the competitive
engagement of major powers in the region (i.e., United States, China,
and Japan). Any major power's attempts to dominate collective security
building in this region are likely to meet opposition from other major
powers, and ASEAN states are suspicious of any arrangements that
would potentially lead to the dominance by a single major power. These
dynamics may explain why China's initiative of establishing an antiSARS international fund was not well received in the Bangkok summit
in April 2003.123 The lack of trust among nations in this region
exacerbates the traditional security dilemma, 124 which has an adverse
effect on global health cooperation. In view of the U.S. presence in the
region and ASEAN countries' fear of being swamped by their huge
neighbor, China cannot play a dominant role in the collective security
building process.
Yet, allowing ASEAN to play a leading role in the process also
undermines the efficacy of regional cooperation on health issues. First,
other things being equal, the transaction costs of collective security
building dominated by major powers are lower. Second, the
nonintervention principle long adopted by ASEAN countries can
negatively affect international cooperation when responding to NTS
crises. As a result, China's cooperation with ASEAN over disease
prevention and control is still largely confined to forums, declarations,
and dialogues. This "consultative security" or "acquiescent security" is
different from the "institutionalized security" or "contractual security"
present in Europe. 125
The negative impact of the traditional security dilemma on the
incentive and efficacy of cooperation over health is evidenced in China's
stance toward the HIV/AIDS crisis in Myanmar. According to the
122. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUIONS OF CAPITALISM 20 (1985).
123. LIANG QINGYIN, FEIDIAN: FANSI Yu DUIcE [SARS: REFLECTIONS AND

COUNTERMEASURES] 231 (2003) (Guangzhou, P.R.C.).
124. Fang Changping & Xiong Bingdi, Dongya feichuantong anquan hezuo tanjiu [A
Study of Non-traditional Security Cooperation in East Asia], JIAOXUE YU YANJIU
[TEACHING AND RESEARCH], issue no. 9, 2007, at 61 (P.R.C.).
125. See Wang, supra note 37.
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annual report of the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
(UNAIDS), Myanmar ranks with Thailand and Cambodia as among the
three countries in Southeast Asia with high annual HIV prevalence
rates. 26 While its adult HIV prevalence rate (0.7 percent) was less than
that of Thailand (1.4 percent) or Cambodia (0.9 percent) in 2006,
Myanmar is considered a primary contributor to the spread of
HIV/AIDS in Southeast Asia and China, given its extreme poverty, drug
trafficking, rampant sex trade, and lack of health care or education
programs for people with HIV or vulnerable groups living along its
porous borders. The spillover from Myanmar accounts for the high HIV
prevalence rate (1.5-2 percent) in the neighboring Yunnan province of
China and has fueled a spike in HIV rates in China since the late
1 27
1980s.
Viewing the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Myanmar as a threat to
international security, a September 2005 report commissioned by
former Czech President Vaclav Havel and South African archbishop
Desmond Tutu called for the U.N. Security Council to act on the
country's failure to address the epidemic. In January 2007, these
concerns were included in a resolution introduced by the U.S.
government at the U.N. Security Council. China, together with Russia,
came to Myanmar's defense by casting vetoes against the resolution on
grounds that the situation in Myanmar did not pose a threat to
international peace and security. Beijing's veto was significant because
it had used it only four times in the past.
Resolving the HIV/AIDS challenges in Myanmar would call for more
proactive international intervention, but Myanmar's role as Beijing's
long-term strategic ally makes such an intervention too risky and costly
for China. China has become Myanmar's second-largest trading partner;
it also needs Myanmar to access the oil and gas directly from the Middle
East and Africa without passing through the Malacca Strait. According
to one Chinese scholar, regional strategic concerns were the main
reason behind the U.S. resolution on Myanmar at the U.N. Security
Council. 128 Beijing was convinced that, if the resolution was passed, it
might serve as a Trojan horse to bring U.S. influence to bear on
Myanmar, which would be against China's foreign policy goal of

126. See UNAIDS, 2008 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS EPIDEMIC (2008), http://data.

unaids.orglpub/GlobalReport/2008/20080813_gr08_prev1549_1990_2007_en.xls.
127. See generally Yanzhong Huang, The Politics of HIVIAIDS in China, 30 ASIAN
PERSP. 1, 95-125 (2006).
128. Xiao De, Zhongguo zai lianheguo dongyong foujuequan, Miandianganxie Zhongguo
[China Used Veto Power at UN; Myanmar Thanked China], GuoJi XIAINQU DAOBAO [INT'L
HERALD TRIB.], Jan. 18, 2007, available at http:l/sites.google.com/sitelshanstatenewsll
2007011904.
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preventing the U.S. from completing its encirclement of China. This
overwhelming concern for traditional security explains China's
reluctance to use fully the U.N. Security Council in addressing global
NTS threats, such as HIV/AIDS, in spite of the recommendations of
some leading policy experts. 129 It also partially explains why China is
not as enthusiastic in cooperating with ASEAN countries over
HIV/AIDS as it is over SARS or avian influenza.
Caught between China and the United States, Indonesia, the only
ASEAN member on the U.N. Security Council, abstained on the
proposed U.S. resolution. Apparently influenced by the nonintervention
principle, it echoed China's position that issues like HIV/AIDS "did not
make Myanmar a threat to international peace and security" even
though "they inflicted suffering on the people of Myanmar." 30 Put
differently, even though HIV/AIDS should be considered a human
security challenge, it did not pose a threat to traditional security,
therefore international collective action against Myanmar was not
justified. Again, the mixture of traditional and nontraditional security
challenges underscored the complexities and challenges China and its
neighbors face in institutionalizing their cooperation mechanisms to
address public health problems
C. Science vs. Politics
In conceptualizing the relationship between health and foreign
policy, Fidler envisions an approach under which scientific evidence is
marshaled for policy purposes through the lens of state interests. 31 In
this way, the science-politics dynamic strikes an appropriate balance
between pursuing health as an end in itself and using health as merely
a vehicle for statecraft. But he also cautions that the science-politics
dynamic can be dangerously unstable. 132 The ability for foreign policy
experts to act on the foresight of science can be constrained by the lack
of health system capabilities-a problem that is commonly found in
countries most at risk of disease outbreaks. The interplay between
politics and science becomes particularly a concern when countries are
dealing with a novel pathogen, whose etiology, transmission, and
virulence are unknown to scientists and policy makers. To navigate the
microbial and political worlds' complexities and uncertainties, decision
129. Wang, supranote 37, at 33.

130. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Fails to Adopt Draft Resolution
on Myanmar, U.N. Doc. SC/8939 (Jan. 12, 2007), availableat http://www.un.orgNews
Press/docs/2007/sc8939.doc.htm.

131. See Fidler, supra note 8, at 185.
132. Id. at 191.
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makers naturally lean heavily on previous experiences and/or
preexisting policy frameworks, adjusting only at the margins to
accommodate distinctive features of new situations. 133 The ability of
science to drive interventions against threats to human health may be
further compromised as science itself is not always politically neutral.
Indeed, once health is transformed from a humanitarian, technical "low
politics" issue to one that features prominently on many political
agendas, states' responses to public health will be increasingly
subordinate to domestic political deliberations and interventions,
leading to actions that might have negative repercussions at the
international level.
The negative dynamics between health and politics are revealed in
China's handling of the recent H1N1 influenza outbreak. A descendant
of the 1918 Spanish flu virus, H1N1 is popularly known as "swine flu."
However, scientists found it difficult to pinpoint the origin of the virus,
to determine how easily the virus spread between people, and to predict
how severe the virus will become in the general population. 34 Unlike its
initial response to the SARS outbreak, the Chinese government took
swift and decisive actions against the H1N1 flu from the very beginning.
On April 25, 2009, the very day China received reports from WHO about
the disease, the government ordered airports to screen stringently
inbound passengers from Mexico and other countries that had reported
confirmed H1N1 cases. One week later, it suspended direct flights from
Mexico after a Mexican passenger who transited through Shanghai was
confirmed in Hong Kong to have H1N1 flu. Even though he was the only
known Mexican infected with H1N1 in China, the authorities rounded
up all travelers aboard the flight, including a number of Mexican
passport holders who had not been home in months. 35 According to the
Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China was the only country where
36
Mexicans had been confined against their will.'
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N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009, at Al.
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These measures, initially targeting Mexican nationals, immediately
triggered a diplomatic row between China and Mexico. Calling Chinese
measures "discriminatory and ungrounded," Mexican Foreign Minister
Patricia Espinosa even advised Mexicans to stay away from China. On
May 3, Mexico's president lashed out at countries he said were "acting
out of ignorance and disinformation" and taking "repressive,
discriminatory measures."1 37 Ironically, just three days later, Espinosa
expressed "sincere gratitude" for the humanitarian aid worth U.S.$5
million offered by China. 138 The situation had been so tense that the
Mexican government chartered a plane to bring home all seventy
Mexican citizens being quarantined in China.
As the Mexicans departed, China clashed with Canada over a group
of Canadian university students placed in quarantine when they landed
at the northeastern city of Jilin on May 2, 2009, despite the fact that
they had been cleared through customs in Beijing and none of them had
been exposed to the virus or were experiencing any flu-like symptoms.
The quarantine prompted the Canadian Embassy in Beijing and WHO
to seek clarification from the Chinese government. The timing could not
have been worse: it came as the Canadian Foreign Minister Lawrence
Cannon prepared to travel to China to try to improve Sino-Canadian
relations.
Under international pressure, the quarantine of Canadian students
was finally lifted two days earlier than China originally planned. By
then, however, China's anti-swine flu measures had complicated SinoCanadian relations. Despite WHO's call for countries not to impose
trade restrictions, China's Ministry of Agriculture on April 27 instituted
a ban on pork and pork products from Mexico and three U.S. states.
China extended the ban to Canada (the third largest pork exporter to
China) on May 3 after pigs in Alberta tested positive for the H1N1 flu
virus. Although China defended these measures as necessary to block
swine flu from spreading to China, the pork ban was hard to justify on
public health grounds, as China's Ministers of Health and Agriculture
both agreed that swine flu had nothing to do with eating pork. 139 The
lack of a public health justification for the pork ban meant that the ban
probably violated the IHR (2005), which require that trade-restrictive
health measures be based on WHO recommendations or a legitimate
public health justification provided to WHO upon request. Accusing
137. Id.
138. Chinese, Mexican FMs Talk Over Phone About Swine Flu, PEOPLE DAILY ONLINE,
Apr. 30, 2009, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/6648332.html (last
visited Oct. 9, 2009).
139. Luke Meredith, US Pork Industry Baffled by Bans in China, Russia, A.P. FIN.
WIRE, June 4, 2009.
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China of "operating outside of sound science," the Canadian Agriculture
Minister threatened to file a complaint with the WTO if China did not
140
lift the ban.
China is not the only country whose relations with Mexico soured
because of the HIN1 outbreak; neither is it the only one that banned
pork imports from North America. 141 What is puzzling is that China
sustained and even stepped up its efforts to contain the spread of the
H1N1 virus, as the situation in Mexico stabilized and many countries
decided to scale down their response measures after gaining more
information about the disease. 142 On May 22, China began screening
every inbound international flight. According to the information
provided by the International Air Transport Association in mid-June,
China was the only nation conducting onboard temperature checks and
quarantining groups of passengers. 143 If a passenger was found to have
a fever, at least part of the plane was quarantined. 44 For those who had
cleared customs, they were still subject to enforced quarantine in
government-designated facilities if found to have had close contact with
even a suspect case. One day after his arrival in Shanghai in early June,
for example, New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin was held in quarantine
simply because a passenger in the row ahead of him exhibited flu-like
symptoms. The quarantining smacked of an Orwellian approach to
public health. Indeed, as this article was being written, China was still
holding several thousand people in government quarantine facilities.
Among all the affected countries, China has been the most draconian in
responding to the H1N1 outbreak.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman defended such aggressive
and intrusive measures as "purely a matter of public health."'145 But are
140. Canada Threatens WTO Complaint for China Pork Ban, ECON. TIMES, May 5,
2009, available at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/International-Business/
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141. For examples of countries acting "irrationally," see Jose Carreno Figueras, Mexico
Bitter About Panic Over Swine Flu, WASH. TIMES, May 14, 2009, at B3.
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LIANHE ZAOBAO [UNITED MORNING PAPER] (Singapore), May 18, 2009, available at
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the measures scientifically justifiable? The pork ban was clearly a
nonsensical method of disease control, given the predominately humanto-human transmission of H1N1 and the safety assurances Beijing has
received from WHO and the World Organization for Animal Health. In
light of these facts, experts speculated that the government was using
the swine flu scare as a convenient excuse to restrict imports and give a
boost to the country's hog industry, which saw a 28.6 percent drop in
pork prices in April. 146 This theory is supported by the finding that,
prior to the H1N1 flu outbreak, China "had deployed several arguments
to try to keep out American pork."'147 Indicating that China was

exploiting legitimate concern over public health to engage in
protectionism, the U.S. Agricultural Secretary warned that any actions
not based on sound science "could do extraordinary damage, not just to
14
our economy but to those of other countries, as well."'

Given the uncertainty surrounding the H1N1 virus and the prospect
of H1N1 mixing with H5N1-the highly lethal avian influenza virus that
appears to be endemic in China-other measures such as stricter medical
checks and quarantine appeared to be more justifiable. Having been
criticized for their belated response during the initial stage of the SARS
outbreak, decision makers in Beijing were sensitive to allegations that
they were not reacting responsibly to health crises. After all, China was
still gripped by memories of SARS when responding to the H1N1
outbreak. Indeed, the official guidelines on H1N1 prevention and control
unveiled on May 1 clearly targeted a SARS-like virus. Apparently
having SARS in mind, a health ministry spokesman said that "[a] largescale breakout would be fatal for China.' 1 49 The failure to differentiate
between SARS and H1N1 in terms of their transmissibility and
virulence nevertheless made the draconian and intrusive border control
and quarantine measures not as effective as the government claimed.

For one thing, SARS carriers are only contagious when they show
symptoms, but, in the case of H1N1, asymptomatic people can shed the
virus. Of the 35.7 million visitors checked from April 25 to July 15, only
0.04 percent were found to have signs of flu, and 455 people, or about
one per 100,000 visitors, were confirmed to have H1N1 flu. 150
146. China's CPI Falls 1.5% in April, CHINA DAILY, May 11, 2009, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cnbizchina/2009-05/1 1/content_7762947.htm.
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149. See Bennett, supranote 143.
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Of the total number of confirmed cases by July 15 (1,444), border
screening identified less than one third of the cases. Similarly, there is
no indication that rounding up apparently healthy individuals and
confining them to government-designated facilities worked as an
effective method of disease control. The influenza virus is much more
infectious and moves too fast to be contained in the same way as SARS.
Based on the epidemiological data provided by the Ministry of Health
and the Chinese Center for Disease Control, this research finds that as
of June 18 (date of the most recent epidemiological data available as of
this writing), only twenty-three confirmed cases were identified through
"concentrated medical observation," a euphemism for enforced
quarantine. If we combine these cases with the ninety confirmed cases
identified as a result of strict border screening, a total of 113 cases, or
37.4 percent, were identified through the strict border control and
quarantine measures. 151 This information means that more than sixty
percent of the cases were identified through self-reporting.
Even if the heavy-handed approaches are not scientifically justified,
they make perfect political sense. Forceful measures, such as enforced
quarantines and travel restrictions, are widely credited with helping
stop the spread of SARS, so it was no surprise that the Chinese
government made them the silver bullet for all infectious diseases. In
the eyes of government leaders, the failure to differentiate between
different viruses is secondary as compared to having a visible approach
the top leaders want to demonstrate to the Chinese people and the
international society. The political leaders were more interested in
presenting an image that the government was acting differently from
SARS, that it indeed placed top priority on people's health and wellbeing.
On the eve of the twentieth anniversary of the Tiananman
crackdown, the government's forceful action against H1N1 helped shore
up its legitimacy. A survey conducted by the China Youth Daily
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suggests that eighty-five percent of the Chinese expressed satisfaction
with the draconian government measures. 152 To be sure, Communist
Party leaders emphasized "science" and the "rule by law" in undertaking
the anti-H1N1 measures. Yet, when they made H1N1 prevention and
control a top national priority and warned that it would punish any
failures to monitor or report the spread of the disease, nonscientific,
heavy-handed measures became more appealing to local government
officials. As shown in the Jilin quarantine case, policy implementers
found it safer to be overzealous than to be seen as "soft." In sum, once
health became a common denominator for political action, it reversed
the science-politics dynamics, generating negative repercussions for
foreign relations and global health governance.
CONCLUSION

In the Cold War era, the health-foreign policy dynamics in China
took the form of a limited "health diplomacy" that served a foreign
policy agenda reflecting China's hostility toward the existing
international order. National and international developments in the
1980s and 1990s, as well as the 2002-03 SARS crisis, reshaped the
discourse on security and foreign policy, leading to a "health as foreign
policy" transformation that saw profound changes in the substance and
style of China's participation in international cooperation on health. As
the government recognizes the importance of health in fulfilling all the
governance functions of foreign policy (security, economic well-being,
international development, and human dignity), it pursues health as a
foreign policy concern in its fullest sense. Furthermore, China's
engagement in international health has become more active,
sophisticated, multilateral, and transparent. These developments have
contributed to the achievement of its desired foreign policy objectives, on
the one hand, and improvement in global health, on the other.
However, China's active engagement in global health is primarily
driven by a foreign policy agenda that focuses on expanding
international influence while improving international image. Although
China recognizes that solutions to global health problems necessitate
neoliberal strategies of cooperation over disease prevention and control,
its actions on global health problems are still justified from the lens of
classical realism that focuses on power, influence, and security. The
efforts to utilize health initiatives to promote narrowly defined national
152. Huang Chong, 85.2% gongzhong manyi Zhongguo fangkong jiaxing HIN1 liugan
jucuo [85.2% of the Public Are Satisfied with the Measures Taken to Prevent and Control
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interests, as demonstrated in Margret Chan's WHO DG campaign and
China's reinvigorated health diplomacy in Africa, may produce benefits
that trickle down in terms of facilitating global health governance or
improving international health status. The danger is that when health
is placed in the realm of realpolitik, it runs the risk of being "dependent
on the logic of such politics-which is not based on science and not
subject to public deliberation and peer review, but on the Machiavellian
153
instincts of those in power."
This tension helps explain why China, in its pursuit of health as
foreign policy, is still constrained by the traditional concerns of
sovereignty and national security. The two dilemmas (state sovereignty
vs. global health, traditional vs. nontraditional security) not only hinder
the fulfillment of China's foreign policy objectives, but also undermine
the incentives and efficacy for China to engage in international health.
In essence, the emergence of such dilemmas signals the connection of
health policy to "a kind of permanent dialogue between Rousseau [the
realist] and Kant [the idealist]. '"154 This sobering reality can be
compounded by the growing emphasis on health as a preeminent
domestic political value for the Communist Party and its leadership. As
shown in China's overreaction on H1N1, the politicization of public
health problems can lead a country to pursue a political agenda that
does not address the needs or concerns of others, and which eventually
undercuts trust and goodwill among states. In short, China's pursuit of
health as foreign policy presents both opportunities for and risks to
global health governance.
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